Curtailing the First Amendment Protection to Discovery by Durri, Silvia
Touro Law Review 
Volume 29 




Curtailing the First Amendment Protection to Discovery 
Silvia Durri 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview 
 Part of the Civil Procedure Commons, Constitutional Law Commons, and the First Amendment 
Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Durri, Silvia (2014) "Curtailing the First Amendment Protection to Discovery," Touro Law Review: Vol. 29 : 
No. 4 , Article 8. 
Available at: https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol29/iss4/8 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in Touro Law Review by an authorized editor of Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center. For 
more information, please contact lross@tourolaw.edu. 
Curtailing the First Amendment Protection to Discovery 
Cover Page Footnote 
29-4 
This article is available in Touro Law Review: https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol29/iss4/8 
 
1063 
CURTAILING THE FIRST AMENDMENT PROTECTION TO 
DISCOVERY 
SUPREME COURT OF NEW YORK 
KINGS COUNTY 
Krystal G. v. Roman Catholic Diocese of Brooklyn1 
(decided October 14, 2011) 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Parents and natural guardians, Vivian G. and Juan F., on be-
half of their daughter Krystal G., and in their individual capacities 
filed a suit against the Roman Catholic Diocese of Brooklyn, the par-
ish, congregation, church, school (“Vincentian defendants”), and 
former pastor Joseph Agostino (“Agostino”) for allegedly negligently 
hiring, retaining and supervising former assistant pastor “Cortez.”2  
Defendant Agostino moved to dismiss the claims against him in a 
summary judgment motion.3  However, the Supreme Court of Kings 
County denied the motion as premature.4  In turn, on cross motion, 
the parents moved to compel defendant Cortez and the Vincentian de-
fendants to provide certain requested discovery documents that the 
defendants alleged were protected by the “priest-penitent” privilege.5 
The documents sought consisted of documented action taken 
 
1 933 N.Y.S.2d 515 (Sup. Ct. 2011). 
2 Id. at 519-22.  Former assistant pastor Cortez, was also sued for alleged sexual assault 
and battery of the parents’ daughter at school when she was twelve years old.  Id. at 519. 
3 Id. at 525. 
4 Id.  New York’s Civil Practice Law and Rules, section 3212(f) authorizes denying a 
summary judgment motion if it appears from affidavits submitted in opposition that facts es-
sential to justify opposition may exist but cannot yet be stated.  N.Y. C.P.L.R. 3212 (McKin-
ney 2009).  Here, discovery had not yet taken place, and the parents’ affidavit referenced 
discoverable materials, exclusively within Cortez’s and the Vincentian defendants’ control 
that could support the parents’ contention that Agostino either knew or should have known 
of Cortez’s propensity to act in the manner that caused the infant’s injuries.  Krystal G., 933 
N.Y.S.2d at 523. 
5 Id. at 519-22.  The Vincentian defendants, on cross motion, “sought a protective order, 
governing confidential materials . . . limiting discovery and precluding the plaintiffs from in-
quiring into allegations of sexual assault by Agostino himself.”  Id. at 521. 
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by the school administration affirming Agostino’s authorization of 
Cortez’s presence at the school even though the school’s administra-
tors had undertaken action to remove Cortez from the school premis-
es.6  Specifically, the school’s removal action was a direct result of an 
ongoing concern about Cortez’s contact with the school children.7 
The crux of the issue was whether the defendants’ documents 
sought by the parents in discovery were privileged and thus preclud-
ed, due to the religious/spiritual considerations and the church doc-
trine, under the Free Exercise Clause and the Establishment Clause of 
the United States Constitution’s First Amendment.8 
The New York Supreme Court, Kings County correctly ap-
plied federal and New York case law in finding that the United States 
Constitution’s First Amendment protection did not bar the parents’ 
discovery of the defendants’ documents.9  This Note will explore a 
New York court trend of resolving controversies based on purely 
secular legal law, without also deciding intra-religious disputes or the 
use of religious dogma. 
II.   THE OPINION—KRYSTAL G. V. ROMAN CATHOLIC DIOCESE 
OF BROOKLYN 
The court in Krystal G. reached its conclusion based on the 
application of three principles of law.10  First, the court applied the 
three-prong Lemon test and stated that allowing the exchange of the 
documents requested would not foster excessive government entan-
glement.11  Second, the court applied and relied upon the neutral 
principles of law doctrine and stated that courts can and must resolve 
such issues where neutral principles of law can be applied without es-
tablishing the church doctrine to resolve the dispute.12  Specifically, 
because Krystal’s claims embraced substantive law consisting of neg-
ligent supervision of a subordinate and physical contact with a child, 
the court found it could resolve the same without the use of religious 
 
6 Id. at 520. 
7 Id. 
8 Krystal G., 933 N.Y.S.2d at 526.  These documents where self-described by the defend-
ants as a “plan” and a “report” that contains “inter-priest communications related to Father 




12 Krystal G., 933 N.Y.S.2d at 526. 
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dogma, thereby allowing discovery of the documents at issue.13  Fi-
nally, balancing competing interests between the state discovery stat-
utes and Krystal G.’s First Amendment privilege, the court found that 
the need for the parents’ discovery demands outweighed the burden 
of the defendants to provide the documents.14 
A.  First Amendment: Free Exercise and 
Establishment Clauses 
The First Amendment of the United States Constitution pro-
hibits any “law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting 
the free exercise thereof.”15  It embraces both the freedom to believe 
and the freedom to act.16  While freedom to believe is absolute, the 
freedom to act is not.17  Most importantly, intentional and criminally 
offensive conduct is not insulated from prosecution under the First 
Amendment.18  Religious entities must be held accountable for their 
actions, “even if that conduct is carried out as part of the church’s re-
ligious practices.”19  Furthermore, the purpose of the Establishment 
Clause is not to safeguard individual rights, but rather to serve as a 
structural restraint on governmental power from legislating or acting 
on any matter “respecting [the] establishment of religion.”20 
In a fairly recent decision, the Supreme Court in Locke v. 
Davey21 acknowledged that although to a large extent the Establish-
ment and the Free Exercise clauses are complementary to each other, 
there is often tension between these provisions.22  The issue in Locke 
was whether the State of Washington’s prohibition of the use of 
scholarships for “devotional studies” violated the Establishment 
 
13 Id. at 527 
14 Id. at 526. 
15 U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
16 Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303-05 (1940).  While the First Amendment of 
the United States Constitution prohibits regulation of religious beliefs, conduct by a religious 
entity “remains subject to regulation for the protection of society.”  Id. at 304. 
17 Id. at 303-05. 
18 Kenneth R. v. Roman Catholic Diocese of Brooklyn, 654 N.Y.S.2d 791, 796 (App. Div. 
2d Dep’t 1997). 
19 Meroni v. Holy Spirit Ass’n for Unification of World Christianity, 506 N.Y.S.2d 174, 
203 (App. Div. 2d Dep’t 1986). 
20 U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
21 540 U.S. 712 (2004). 
22 Id. at 718.  In a majority opinion, Chief Justice Rehnquist stated that the case involved 
“tension” and “the play in the joints” between the establishment and free exercise clauses.  
Id. 
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Clause.23  Washington offered a program of giving scholarships to 
students who qualified, academically and financially, and who at-
tended college in the state.24  However, the program did not allow re-
cipients to pursue a devotional theology degree.25  Joshua Davey at-
tended a private Christian college in Washington, and was a recipient 
of Washington’s “promise scholarship” program.26  When Davey 
sought to double major for business management and ministry, he 
was informed that he could not receive the promise scholarship if he 
pursued ministry.27  Davey refused the aid and filed suit to challenge 
Washington’s restriction, arguing that it violated the Free Exercise 
Clause of the First Amendment.28 
In a 7-2 decision, the Supreme Court in Davey held that a 
state government could restrict its college scholarships as to prevent 
them from being used by those studying ministry.29  The Court em-
phasized that while state governments may constitutionally allow the 
use of scholarship for ministry study purposes, it was not constitu-
tionally required to do so.30  The Court reasoned that denying Davey 
scholarship money to study ministry did not interfere with his free 
exercise of religion in any way, as he could still receive training to be 
a pastor, just without it being subsidized by the government.31 
Thus, Locke illustrates that while the State may have the abil-
ity to provide aid for religious studies without creating excessive en-
tanglement with religious doctrine, it may choose not to provide such 
aid without violating the Free Exercise Clause.32 
 
23 Id. at 719. 
24 Id. at 715. 
25 Locke, 540 U.S. at 716. 
26 Id. at 717. 
27 Id. 
28 Id. 
29 Id. at 712 (majority opinion); Locke, 540 U.S. at 725 (“The State’s interest in not fund-
ing the pursuit of devotional degrees is substantial and the exclusion of such funding places a 
relatively minor burden on Promise Scholars. If any room exists between the two Religion 
Clauses, it must be here.  We need not venture further into this difficult area in order to up-
hold the Promise Scholarship Program as currently operated by the State of Washington.”).   
30 See id. at 719 (indicating that Washington could, if it wanted, allow its scholarship as-
sistance to study for the ministry). 
31 Locke, 540 U.S. at 720.  Locke stands for the significance that government at all levels 
can choose how it wants to spend tax payers’ money and the extent, if any, it wants to finan-
cially support religion, and that this choice is to be made by the political process and not the 
courts.  Id. 
32 Id. 
4
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1. Avoiding Conflict with the Religion Clauses 
In avoiding conflict with the religion clauses of the First 
Amendment, and in determining whether a statute is valid with re-
spect to the Establishment Clause, the Supreme Court established a 
three-part test.33  The three-part test was first established in Lemon v. 
Kurtzman.34  The first prong of the Lemon test is the requirement that 
there be a secular purpose for a law.35  The second prong requires that 
the principal or primary effect of a law must be one that neither ad-
vances nor prohibits religion.36  The third prong forbids government 
actions that cause excessive entanglement with religion.37  In deter-
mining whether the government entanglement is excessive, a court 
must examine the character and purposes of the institutions that are 
benefited, the nature of the aid the state provides, and the resulting re-
lationship between the government and the religious authority.38  Su-
preme Court cases have interpreted the third prong as involving some 
permissible level of entanglement.39  The courts have held that entan-
glement must be excessive before it violates the Establishment 
Clause.40 
 
33 Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971). 
34 403 U.S. 602 (1971). 
35 Id. at 612.  The rationale for the first prong of the Lemon test is that the very essence of 
the establishment clause is to keep the government from acting to advance religion.  Id.  See, 
e.g., Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39, 41 (1980) (declaring unconstitutional a state law that re-
quired the Ten Commandments to be posted on the walls of every public school classroom, 
by concluding that the law had no secular legislative purpose, thus violating the establish-
ment clause). 
36 Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612; Estate of Thorton v. Caldor, 472 U.S. 703 (1985).  In Thorton, 
the Court used the second prong of the Lemon test to invalidate a Connecticut statute provid-
ing that no person may be required by an employer to work on his or her Sabbath.  Id. at 710.  
The Court reasoned that the statute went beyond having an incidental or remote effect of ad-
vancing religion, rather it had a primary effect of impermissibly advancing a particular reli-
gious practice.  Id. 
37 Lemon, 403 U.S. at 613. 
38 Id. at 615. 
39 See, e.g., Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 204, 232 (1997) (holding that New York 
City’s Board of Education’s program consisting of sending school teachers into parochial 
schools to provide remedial education to disadvantaged children did not violate the Estab-
lishment Clause). 
40 Id.; see also, Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589, 615 (1988) (finding no excessive en-
tanglement where the government reviewed the adolescent counseling program set up by the 
religious institutions that are grantees, and monitored the program by periodic visits); Roe-
mer v. Bd. of Pub. Works of Md., 426 U.S. 736, 766 (1976) (finding no excessive entangle-
ment where state conducted annual audits to ensure that state grants to religious colleges 
were not used to teach religion). 
5
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In Lemon, the Court was faced with the issue of whether two 
state statutes that provided state aid to church-related educational in-
stitutions violated the First Amendment’s Establishment Clause.41  
The Pennsylvania statute provided financial support for teacher sala-
ries, textbooks, and instructional materials for secular subjects to 
non-public schools.42  The Rhode Island statute provided direct sup-
plemental salary payments to teachers in non-public elementary 
schools.43  In a unanimous decision, the Court held that both statutes 
were unconstitutional under the religion clauses of the First Amend-
ment because they were “promoting secular legislative purposes.”44  
The Court reasoned that the statutes “involved excessive entangle-
ment of state with church.”45 
The entanglement in the Pennsylvania statute was that in ad-
dition to providing direct aid to church schools, it also led to an inti-
mate and continuing relationship between the church and the state.46  
This relationship arose from the state’s scrutiny power to inspect and 
evaluate schools’ financial records and to determine which expendi-
tures were religious and which were secular.47  The Court stated that 
this posed a danger of divisive political activity and possibility of 
progression toward the establishment of state churches and state reli-
gion.48  The Court found entanglement in the Rhode Island statute 
because the aid constituted an integral part of the religious mission of 
the church, for two reasons.49  First, the recipient teachers were under 
religious control and discipline.50  Second, the aid provided involved 
comprehensive and continuing state surveillance to insure the recipi-
ent’s obedience to the restrictions as to the courses that could be 
taught and the materials that could be used.51 
In an attempt to provide a clearer standard for when a contro-
versy could be resolved without the court having to decide intra-
religious disputes, the Supreme Court subsequently revisited the 
 
41 Lemon, 403 U.S. at 625. 
42 Id. at 620. 
43 Id. at 615. 
44 Id. at 603. 
45 Id. 
46 Lemon, 403 U.S. at 603. 
47 Id. 
48 Id.  
49 Id. 
50 Id. 
51 Lemon, 403 U.S. at 603. 
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Lemon test one year later in Wisconsin v. Yoder.52  Yoder involved 
three members of the Old Order Amish Religion that were prosecuted 
under a Wisconsin law that required all children to attend public 
school until the age of sixteen.53  These defendants refused to send 
their children to public schools upon completion of eighth grade, ar-
guing that high school attendance was contrary to their religious be-
liefs.54  The Court prefaced the discussion of the First Amendment is-
sue by stating that “to have the protection of the Religion Clauses, the 
claims must be rooted in religious belief.”55  With this philosophy as 
a back drop, the Court found that the values and programs of second-
ary school were “in sharp conflict with the fundamental mode of life 
mandated by the Amish religion,” and that an additional one or two 
years of high school would not produce the benefits of public educa-
tion cited by Wisconsin to justify the law.56 
In an opinion by Chief Justice Burger, the Court held that the 
“First Amendment prevents a state from compelling Amish parents to 
cause their children, who have graduated from eighth grade, to attend 
formal high school to age sixteen.”57  Justice White, in a concurring 
opinion, stated that the administration of an exemption for the Amish 
people from the state’s school-attendance laws would inevitably in-
volve the kind of close scrutiny of religious practices that the First 
Amendment protects against.58  However, relying on Sherbert v. 
Verner,59 the court reasoned that such monitoring entanglement does 
not create a forbidden establishment of religion where it is essential 
to implement free exercise values, threatened by an otherwise neutral 
program instituted to foster some permissible, nonreligious state ob-
jective.60 
Yoder, and cases that followed, created the potential for chal-
lenges by religious groups to a wide range of laws that conflict with 
 
52 406 U.S. 205 (1972). 
53 Id.  
54 Id. 
55 Id. at 215. 
56 Id. at 217. 
57 Yoder, 406 U.S. 205. 
58 Id. at 240. 
59 Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 406 (1963) (finding denial of unemployment benefits 
unconstitutionally burdened plaintiff’s free exercise by forcing a choice between abandoning 
Saturday religious practice or forfeiting benefits, but noting the statute excepted those wor-
shipping on Sundays from having to make the same choice). 
60 Yoder, 406 U.S. at 240. 
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the principles of their faiths, because such laws impose penalties ei-
ther for engaging in religiously motivated conduct or for refusing to 
engage in religiously prohibited conduct.61 
However, in 1990, the Court reversed this course and sharply 
restricted the scope of the Free Exercise Clause’s reach with respect 
to laws of general applicability in Employment Division v. Smith.62  
The Court considered the Constitutionality of Oregon’s controlled 
substance law—which outlawed the use of peyote—as applied to 
members of the Native American Church, who ingested peyote for 
sacramental purposes.63  Smith involved two drug counselors that 
were employed by a nonprofit company, which had a written policy 
requiring them to stay drug-free and alcohol-free as a condition for 
employment.64  They used an illegal drug, peyote, as part of a Native 
American Church service, and were thereafter fired for engaging in 
work-related misconduct.65  Though there was no dispute that their 
religious beliefs were sincerely held and that the Native American 
Church used peyote in its religious services, they were denied unem-
ployment compensation by the State.66  Following the denial, they ar-
gued that the First Amendment forbade the state from denying unem-
ployment compensation when their underlying conduct was 
religiously motivated.67 
The Court ruled that the Free Exercise Clause “does not re-
lieve an individual of the obligation to comply with a valid and neu-
tral law of general applicability on the ground that the law proscribes 
conduct that his religion prescribes.”68  In doing so, the Court de-
clined to overrule prior cases69 that had granted religious exemptions 
to general laws, but rather distinguished them on the ground that they 
involved a type of “hybrid situation” in which the free exercise right 
was combined with some other constitutional claim.70 
 
61 See, e.g., Frazee v. Ill. Dep’t of Emp’t Sec., 489 U.S. 829, 834 (1989); Hobbie v. Un-
employment Appeals Comm’n, 480 U.S. 136, 144 (1987); Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 
707, 717-18 (1981). 
62 494 U.S. 872 (1990). 




67 Smith, 494 U.S. at 874. 
68 Id. at 879. 
69 See, e.g., Yoder, 406 U.S. 205. 
70 Smith, 494 U.S. at 881-82. 
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The Court conceded that a law seeking “to ban such acts . . . 
only when they are engaged in for religious reasons, or only because 
of the religious belief that they display” would likely violate the Free 
Exercise Clause.71  However, the Court insinuated that the plaintiffs 
here were seeking to carry the meaning of prohibiting the free exer-
cise of religious one large step further, by claiming that prohibiting 
free exercise includes requiring any individual to observe a generally 
applicable law that requires (or forbids) the performance of an act 
that his religious belief forbids (or requires).72 
The court in Krystal G. also examined state precedent apply-
ing the Lemon test.  For example, the court considered Langford v. 
Roman Catholic Diocese of Brooklyn.73  In Langford, a woman 
brought tort claims against a clergyman and a diocese in connection 
with a sexual relationship that developed over the course of spiritual 
counseling.74  The court in Langford dismissed the claim holding that 
any attempt to define the duty of care owed by a member of the cler-
gy to a parishioner fosters excessive entanglement with religion.75  
The court reasoned that because the plaintiff sought religious and 
spiritual counseling from the defendant, any breach of the defend-
ants’ fiduciary duties could only be construed as clergy malpractice, 
thus necessitating adjudication of religious dogma—which is forbid-
den by the First Amendment.76  However, in a dissenting opinion, 
Justice Miller disagreed with the majority’s holding, stating that the 
First Amendment was not intended to protect the misconduct of cler-
gy where examination of their conduct does not in fact require in-
quiry into intra-religious disputes.77 
While the court in Krystal G. relied on the three-prong test es-
tablished by the Supreme Court in Lemon, ultimately the court came 
to a different conclusion holding that “[t]he Free Exercise and Estab-
lishment Clauses of the United States Constitution’s First Amend-
ment do not preclude the exchange of any documents or items 
[sought by the parents].”78  The court reasoned that it would not be 
 
71 Id. at 877 (alteration in original). 
72 Id. at 878. 
73 705 N.Y.S.2d 661 (App. Div. 2d Dep’t 2000). 
74 Id. at 662. 
75 Id. 
76 Id. at 663. 
77 Id. 
78 Krystal G., 933 N.Y.S.2d at 526 (alteration in original). 
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fostering “excessive governmental entanglement with religion” by 
granting the parents’ discovery requests.79 
Furthermore, while the court in Krystal G. applied the Yoder 
rule, it found the facts to be distinguishable.80  Unlike in Yoder where 
the member’s claims were rooted in the religious beliefs of the 
Amish, in Krystal G., the claims were rooted in the tort claims of 
negligent supervision and retention.81  Additionally, the First 
Amendment issue in Krystal G. arose only as a result of discovery 
requests, which is a procedural mechanism used to prove the underly-
ing claims.82  Thus, in contrast to Yoder, the claims in Krystal G. 
were not rooted in religious beliefs and the court could therefore re-
solve the controversy based on purely secular legal law.83 
Finally, Krystal G. seems to fit perfectly under the Smith era 
of restricting the scope of the Free Exercise Clause’s reach with re-
spect to laws of general applicability.  Specifically, it seems that 
Krystal G. manifests the same view as Smith—which is that defend-
ants were seeking to carry the meaning of prohibiting the free exer-
cise of religion one large step further by maintaining that their ob-
servance of the New York discovery statutes would require them to 
perform an act that their religious belief forbids. 
Moreover, Langford, which refused to resolve the controversy 
before it by holding that any attempt to define the duty of care owed 
by a clergyman to his parishioner would foster excessive entangle-
ment with religion, is also factually distinguishable from Krystal G.84  
One critical difference between Langford and Krystal G. is that in 
Langford, the plaintiff and defendant pastor were involved in reli-
gious counseling, whereas in Krystal G. no such relationship exist-
ed.85  In addition, the claim in Langford would have involved defin-
ing the standard of care of the pastor, because it would have 
necessarily required a determination concerning the defendant’s du-
ties as a member of the clergy offering religious counseling to the 




81 Id. at.520. 
82 Id. at 526. 
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simply either prove or disprove the parents’ claim of negligent reten-
tion, which would not facilitate any substantive determination of a re-
ligious dogma.87 
B. Neutral Principles of Law Doctrine 
In concluding that the First Amendment’s Establishment 
Clause protection did not bar the plaintiffs’ discovery, the court in 
Krystal G. also relied on the neutral principles of law doctrine, which 
provides that “courts can, and must, resolve issues where neutral 
principles of law . . . can be applied without establishing church doc-
trine to resolve the dispute.”88 
In coming to its conclusion, the court relied heavily on the 
United States Supreme Court decision in Presbyterian Church in U.S. 
v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Memorial Presbyterian Church.89  The 
Supreme Court in Presbyterian Church was faced with resolving a 
property dispute that arose when two local churches attempted to 
withdraw from the national Presbyterian Church.90  In an opinion by 
Justice Brennan, the Court held that courts can resolve internal 
church disputes over ownership of property only if the decision will 
entirely turn on secular legal principles, rather than require the courts 
to decide any issues of religious doctrine.91  Thus, the Court stated 
that there are neutral principles of law, developed for use in all prop-
erty disputes, which can be applied without “establishing” churches 
to which property is awarded.92 
The court in Krystal G. also looked to New York precedent in 
applying the neutral principles of law doctrine.93  In its first case deal-
ing with the neutral principles of law doctrine, the New York Court 
of Appeals decided First Presbyterian Church of Schenectady v. 
United Presbyterian Church of the United States.94  In First Presby-
terian Church of Schenectady, at issue was whether the court may re-
 
87 Id. at 525. 
88 Krystal G., 933 N.Y.S.2d at 526; Presbyterian Church v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull 
Memorial Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S. 440, 449 (1969). 
89 393 U.S. 440 (1969). 
90 Id. at 442. 
91 See id. at 449  (“[T]he Amendment therefore commands civil courts to decide church 
property disputes without resolving underlying controversies over the religious doctrine.”). 
92 Id. 
93 Krystal G., 933 N.Y.S.2d at 526. 
94 464 N.E.2d 454 (N.Y.1984). 
11
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solve a dispute between the parties, which arose when plaintiff (“First 
Church”) withdrew from its denominational church organization be-
cause of a disagreement over the defendant’s financial support of rad-
ical political groups and individuals, without violating the First 
Amendment’s prohibition against excessive governmental entangle-
ment.95 
The plaintiff sought a declaration of its independence status 
and a permanent injunction preventing defendants from interfering 
with plaintiff’s use and enjoyment of the local church property.96  
The New York Court of Appeals in First Presbyterian Church of 
Schenectady ruled that in making a neutral principles analysis, it is 
not sufficient to simply be able to identify relevant secular rules, but 
it is also necessary that there exist neutral facts on which to apply 
those rules.97  Neutral facts consist of evidence from which courts 
may discern the objective intention of the parties, such as the lan-
guage of deeds, the terms of a local church charter, state statutes gov-
erning the holding of church property and the like.98  Finally, relying 
on the United States Supreme Court decision in Presbyterian Church, 
the court held that the “State has a legitimate interest in resolving 
property disputes, and . . . a civil court is a proper forum for that reso-
lution.”99  Thus, courts may resolve church property disputes and as a 
result provide injunctive relief to plaintiffs in such actions without 
having to decide intra-religious disputes.100 
The court in Krystal G. also relied on Kelley v. Garuda,101 a 
more recent neutral principles of law case decided by the Appellate 
Division, Second Department.  The court in Kelley also applied the 
Supreme Court’s holding in Presbyterian Church,102 finding that the 
First Amendment did not preclude the court from ruling on a dispute 
because the causes of action alleging trespass were essentially based 
on legal principles of corporate government and property that could 
in fact be resolved without the court having to decide intra-religious 
disputes precluded by the First Amendment.103 
 
95 Id. at 457. 
96 Id. 
97 Id. 
98 Id. at 460-62. 
99 First Presbyterian Church of Schenectady, 464 N.E.2d at 462. 
100 Id. 
101 827 N.Y.S.2d 293 (App. Div. 2d Dep’t 2007). 
102 Id. at 294. 
103 Id.  The court emphasized that defendants failed to establish that the court could not re-
12
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Relying upon the Supreme Court’s decision in Presbyterian 
Church and the New York Court of Appeals’ decision in Kelley, in 
determining whether the neutral principles doctrine applied, the court 
in Krystal G. held that the First Amendment did not preclude the 
court from ruling on the dispute.104  The court in Krystal G. reasoned 
that because the plaintiffs’ claims involved negligent supervision and 
retention of a subordinate’s physical contact with a child, the court 
was not required to resort to matters of religious dogma.105  Rather, 
the court found that it could resolve the plaintiffs’ claims by applying 
the secular rules of New York’s procedural law, discovery statutes, 
and civil legal principles of torts.106 
C.  Balancing Competing Interests Test 
Finally, in reaching its decision, the Supreme Court in Krystal 
G. also considered state precedent that applied a balancing of com-
peting interests analysis.107  The court in Krystal G. relied on a New 
York Court of Appeals case that first adopted the balancing of com-
peting interest test, Andon ex rel Andon v. 302-304 Mott Street 
Ass’n.108  In Andon, a mother brought an action on behalf of herself 
and her infant son, alleging that the infant’s disabilities were caused 
by ingesting lead-based paint.109  The defendant requested discovery 
of the mother’s IQ to determine whether her son’s cognitive disabili-
ties were genetic.110  The trial court granted the defendant’s motion 
and the Appellate Division reversed.111  The Appellate Division con-
cluded that the information sought was not discoverable under CPLR 
3121(a) because the mother’s mental condition was not “in contro-
versy.”112  The New York Court of Appeals affirmed, reasoning that 
 
solve the issues by applying neutral principles of law to analyze the deed to the property.  Id. 
104 Krystal G., 933 N.Y.S.2d at 526. 
105 Id. at 527. 
106 Id.  Hence, the court held that there was no reason why the First Amendment’s Estab-
lishment Clause should bar the plaintiff’s discovery.  Id. 
107 Id. at 526. 
108 731 N.E.2d 589 (N.Y. 2000); Krystal G., 933 N.Y.S.2d at 526. 
109 Andon, 731 N.E.2d 591. 
110 Id.  
111 Id. at 592. 
112 Id. at 593.  The Appellate Division concluded that the burden of subjecting the plain-
tiff-mother to an IQ test outweighed any relevance her IQ would bear on the issue of causa-
tion.  Id. at 596.  The Court also noted that the mother’s mental condition was not in dispute 
and that IQ results, while not confidential, are private.  Andon, 94 N.Y.2d at 596. 
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under the competing interests test, the Appellate Division correctly 
considered the defendants’ need for the information against its possi-
ble relevance, the burden of subjecting the mother to the test, and the 
potential for unfettered litigation on the issue of maternal IQ.113 
New York favors open disclosure under the CPLR 3101.114  
New York’s CPLR 3101(a) grants litigants a broad scope in discover-
ing materials, allowing full disclosure of all matter that is material 
and necessary in the prosecution or defense of an action, regardless of 
burden of proof.115  However, in an effort to afford litigants some 
protection from New York’s broad discovery statute, the Court of 
Appeals held that competing interests must always be balanced.116  
The court stated that the discretionary balance of interests test re-
quires the need of discovery to be weighed against any special burden 
to be borne by the opposing party.117  The information sought to be 
discovered must be in controversy, must aid in the resolution of the 
question and must not unnecessarily broaden the scope of the litiga-
tion and invite extraneous inquiries.118 
The court in Krystal G. applied the balancing test established 
in Andon in reaching its decision that the need for the parents’ dis-
covery demands essentially outweighed the burden of the defendants 
to provide the requested documents.119  In exercising its discretion 
under the balance of interests test, the court reasoned that the docu-
ments requested were directly related to the controversy, as it would 
support the plaintiffs’ contentions of the claims alleged.120  The court 
stated that the discovery requests referenced material exclusively 
within the defendants’ control that may support the parents’ conten-
tion that Defendant Agostino either knew or should have known of 
former assistant pastor Cortez’s propensity to act in the manner that 
 
113 Id.  
114 Id. at 593. 
115 See id. (“What is ‘material and necessary’ is left to the sound discretion of the lower 
courts and includes any facts bearing on the controversy which will assist preparation for tri-
al by sharpening the issues and reducing delay and prolixity.  The test is one of usefulness 
and reason.”); see also Krystal G., 933 N.Y.S.2d at 526 (reciting and applying N.Y. CPLR 
3101 (McKinney 2009)). 
116 Andon, 731 N.E.2d. at 593. 
117 Id.; Krystal G., 933 N.Y.S.2d at 526. 
118 Andon, 731 N.E.2d. at 593-94. 
119 Krystal G., 933 N.Y.S.2d at 526.  The defendants maintained that they were afforded a 
privilege under the First Amendment, to bar inquiry within their confidential religion docu-
ments otherwise permissible under the New York State discovery statute.  Id. 
120 Id. at 525. 
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caused Krystal G.’s and her parents’ injuries.121 
III. COMPARING FEDERAL AND NEW YORK STATE APPROACHES 
TO THE FIRST AMENDMENT’S RELIGION DOCTRINE 
Both state and federal courts acknowledge constitutional lim-
its on judicial involvement in religious doctrine cases, recognizing 
that courts are prohibited from resolving controversies which require 
considerations of intra-religious disputes.122  The Supreme Court has 
held that on issues pertaining to religious concerns, courts are bound 
to accept the decisions of the highest judicatories of a religious or-
ganization of hierarchical polity.123  However, both state and federal 
courts have also established that courts are free to decide such dis-
putes if they can do so without resolving the underlying controversies 
over religious doctrine, using the neutral principles of law ap-
proach.124 
In attempting to draw a bright line rule between what is con-
sidered excessive entanglement with religious doctrine, federal and 
state courts have held that the First Amendment only proscribes 
courts from attempting to define the duty of care owed by a member 
of the clergy to a parishioner.125  For example, in a Southern District 
Court of New York case, Ehrens v. Lutheran Church-Missouri Syn-
od,126 the court held that because it would be inappropriate and un-
constitutional to determine whether the ecclesiastical authorities neg-
ligently supervised or retained a Reverend, it dismissed the case.127  




123 Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S. 440; see also Avitzur v. Avitzur, 446 N.E.2d 136, 139 
(N.Y. 1983) (holding nothing in the law or public policy prevents judicial recognition and 
enforcement of the secular terms of a religious marriage agreement); Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 
595, 602-04, 619 (1979) (holding that nothing in the law or public policy prevents judicial 
recognition and enforcement of the secular terms of a religious marriage agreement, includ-
ing but not limited to issues concerning matters of discipline, faith, internal organization, ec-
clesiastical rule, or custom). 
124 See, e.g., Avitzur, 446 N.E.2d at 138 (“The present case can be solely decided upon the 
application of neutral principles of contract law, without reference to any religious princi-
ple.”). 
125 Ehrens v. Lutheran Church-Missouri Synod, 269 F. Supp. 2d 328, 332 (S.D.N.Y. 
2003) (citing Langford, 705 N.Y.S.2d 661).  Interestingly, both federal and state courts are 
split on the applicability of the duty of care.  Id. 
126 269 F. Supp. 2d 328. 
127 Id. at 332 
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Any inquiry into the policies and practices of the 
Church Defendants in hiring or supervision their cler-
gy raises some kind of First Amendment problems of 
entanglement . . . which might involve the Court in 
making sensitive judgments about the propriety of the 
Church Defendants’ supervision in light of their reli-
gious beliefs. Insofar as concerns retention or supervi-
sion.  The pastor of a Presbyterian church is not anal-
ogous to a common law employee.  He may not demit 
his charge nor be removed by the session, without 
consent of the presbytery, functioning essentially as an 
ecclesiastical court.  The traditional denominations 
each have their own intricate principles of governance, 
as to which the state has no rights of visitation.128 
However, New York State precedent holds that under the doc-
trine of neutral legal principles of law, courts are able to decide some 
controversies so long as they can be resolved without the court also 
having to decide intra-religious disputes.129  This principle was most 
recently depicted in the New York County Supreme Court case, 
Vione v. Tewell.130  In Vione, a parishioner brought a breach of fidu-
ciary duty and negligent retention and supervision action alleging that 
his former minister had an affair with his wife, while acting as the 
couple’s marriage counselor.131  The court was faced with the issue of 
whether the defendant’s First Amendment rights would be violated if 
the court allowed the claims to go further.132  The New York County 
Supreme Court held that the parishioner’s claims could be decided in 
accordance with neutral principles of law without resort to religious 
tenets, policies, or procedures.133  The court stated that breach of fi-
duciary duty and negligent hiring and retention are “well-defined 
bodies of civil law;” thus the First Amendment’s religion clause did 
not bar the claims.134 
While the court in Krystal G. failed to consider Vione in its 
 
128 Id. 
129 Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S. 440, 449; Jones v. Trane, 591 N.Y.S.2d 927 (Sup. Ct. 
1992). 
130 820 N.Y.S.2d 682 (Sup. Ct. 2006). 
131 Id. at 684 
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analysis, it would not have changed the outcome.135  Rather, Vione 
exemplifies the New York State court trend of permitting claims to 
go forward based on a purely secular legal law analysis.136 
One of the cases that the dissent in Langford discussed as 
having established the application of the neutral principles of law 
doctrine is a New York Court of Appeals case, Avitzur v. Avitzur.137  
In Avitzur, plaintiff and defendant were married in 1966 in a ceremo-
ny conducted in accordance with the Jewish tradition.138  Prior to the 
ceremony, the parties signed a document known as “Ketubah,” in 
which both parties agreed to recognize a rabbinical tribunal as having 
authority to counsel the couple in matters concerning their mar-
riage.139  In order for a couple to be considered divorced pursuant to 
the Jewish law, they both have to appear in the rabbinical tribunal to 
obtain a Jewish divorce decree, known as a “Get.”140  The couple was 
granted a civil divorce upon the grounds of cruel and inhuman treat-
ment.141  Notwithstanding this civil divorce, the wife was not consid-
ered divorced and could not remarry pursuant to Jewish law, until the 
“Get” divorce was granted.142 
After the defendant refused to appear, the plaintiff brought an 
action seeking an order compelling defendant’s specific performance 
of the Ketubah.143  The defendant moved to dismiss upon the grounds 
that the document constituted a liturgical agreement, and was there-
fore unenforceable by the State due to the First Amendment claus-
es.144  The Court of Appeals held, in an opinion authored by Judge 
Wachtler, that nothing in law or public policy prevents judicial 
 
135 Krystal G., 933 N.Y.S.2d at 526; Vione, 820 N.Y.S.2d at 685.  This is because Vione 
also applied the neutral principles of law doctrine in resolving the negligent hiring and reten-
tion claims, thereby rendering the First Amendment religious clause protection inapplicable.  
Id. 
136 Vione, 820 N.Y.S.2d at 685; Langford, 705 N.Y.S.2d at 663 (Miller, J., dissenting) 
(pointing out that the majority’s holding “that any attempt to define duty of care owed by a 
member of the clergy to a parishioner fosters excessive entanglement with religion” is incon-
sistent with precedent firmly established in New York). 
137 446 N.E.2d 136 (1983). 




142 Avitzur, 446 N.E.2d at 137. 
143 Id.  Ketubah is a marriage contract.  Id.  The requirement that the parties appear before 
the tribunal in order for both arties to be considered divorced, pursuant to Jewish law comes 
from a clause in the Ketubah.  Id. 
144 Id. at 137. 
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recognition and enforcement of the secular terms of a religious mar-
riage agreement.145  The court reasoned that the relief sought by 
plaintiff was simply to compel the defendant to perform a secular ob-
ligation to which he contractually bound himself.146  Furthermore, the 
court went on to state that to the extent that an enforceable promise 
can be found by the application of neutral principles of contract law, 
plaintiff demonstrated entitlement to the relief sought.147 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The court in Krystal G. was correct in finding that the First 
Amendment did not bar the parents’ discovery requests.148  In reject-
ing the First Amendment claim, the court applied three principal 
tests:  the Lemon test, the neutral principles of law doctrine, and bal-
ancing competing State interests test.149 
In applying the Lemon test, the Krystal G. court adopted the 
view that while the state may not foster excessive governmental en-
tanglement with religion, the First Amendment merely bars courts 
from defining the standard of care that a religious practitioner owes a 
congregant when providing spiritual guidance.150  As an exception to 
this rule, the court also applied the neutral principles of law doctrine 
in an effort to allow the parents to pursue their claims of negligent 
supervision and retention.151  Hence, the court concluded that “the 
Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses . . . do not preclude the ex-
change of any documents or items the [parents] seek,” specifically 
because the parents’ negligent supervision and retention claims could 
be decided on purely secular legal principles.152  Finally, the court 
examined the balancing competing State interests test, ultimately de-
ciding that the need for the parents’ discovery demands essentially 
outweighed the burden of the Vincentian defendants to provide the 
 
145 Avitzur, 446 N.E.2d at 138-40. 
146 Id. 
147 Id. at 138.  But see id. at 139 (Jones, J., dissenting) (“[T]hat to grant  the relief plaintiff 
seeks in this action . . . would necessarily violate the constitutional prohibition against en-
tanglement of our secular courts in matters of religious and ecclesiastical content.”). 




152 Id.  
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documents.153 
The court’s decision in Krystal G. is in accord with New York 
precedent, which has displayed a trend of allowing claims to go for-
ward by applying purely secular legal law and thereby avoiding a col-







153 Krystal G., 933 N.Y.S.2d at 526. 
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